Federalist No. 51

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To keep the powers of government separate in practice, we must design the interior structure so the branches keep each other in their places. We shouldn't just rely on outside rules to maintain this balance.

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Each department should have a will of its own, and members of one should have as little to do with appointing members of the others as possible. If people were perfectly independent in their appointments, they would be less likely to be corrupted by other branches.

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Ideally, all appointments should come from the people, but this would be difficult for the judicial branch. Judges need specific qualifications, and permanent tenures help keep them independent from the politics of elections.

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Members of each department should not be financially dependent on the others. If the President or judges relied on Congress for their personal salaries, their independence would eventually disappear.

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Ambition must be made to counteract ambition — the personal interests of each officeholder become the constitutional guardrail against abuse of power. We must give those in charge both the means and the personal motives to resist interference from other branches.

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It is a sad reflection on human nature that such devices are necessary, but government itself is the greatest reflection on human nature. If men were angels, no government would be needed; since they aren't, we must enable the government to control the governed while also forcing it to control itself.

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In a republic, the legislature is naturally the strongest branch of power. To fix this, we divide the legislature into different branches — the House and Senate — with different ways of electing them and different roles.

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The executive branch might need to be strengthened to defend itself against the legislature. A veto power serves as a shield, though it must be used carefully to avoid becoming a tool of tyranny.

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In the American system, power is first divided between the state and federal governments, and then subdivided into separate departments. This "double security" provides extra protection for the rights of the people.

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It is vital to protect society not just against its rulers, but against the injustice of one faction of society toward another — the same danger of majority tyranny Madison identified in Federalist No. 10 applies within society itself, not just within government. If a majority is united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be in constant danger.

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There are two ways to stop this: either create a power outside the people's control, or include so many different groups of citizens that a single oppressive majority is unlikely. The United States uses the second method by being a large, diverse republic.

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Justice is the ultimate goal of government and civil society. If a system allows the strong to easily unite and oppress the weak, it will collapse into either anarchy or despotism — both representing a total failure of self-governance.

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In a large republic like the United States, the sheer variety of interests makes an oppressive majority almost impossible. The larger the society, the more capable it is of self-governance and protecting every class of citizen.